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Abstract
Background: There seems to be a common belief that women are better in multi-tasking than men, but there is
practically no scientific research on this topic. Here, we tested whether women have better multi-tasking skills
than men.
Methods: In Experiment 1, we compared performance of 120 women and 120 men in a computer-based
task-switching paradigm. In Experiment 2, we compared a different group of 47 women and 47 men on
“paper-and-pencil” multi-tasking tests.
Results: In Experiment 1, both men and women performed more slowly when two tasks were rapidly interleaved
than when the two tasks were performed separately. Importantly, this slow down was significantly larger in the male
participants (Cohen’s d = 0.27). In an everyday multi-tasking scenario (Experiment 2), men and women did not differ
significantly at solving simple arithmetic problems, searching for restaurants on a map, or answering general
knowledge questions on the phone, but women were significantly better at devising strategies for locating a lost key
(Cohen’s d = 0.49).
Conclusions: Women outperform men in these multi-tasking paradigms, but the near lack of empirical studies on
gender differences in multitasking should caution against making strong generalisations. Instead, we hope that other
researchers will aim to replicate and elaborate on our findings.
Background
In the current study, we address the question whether
women are better multi-taskers than men. The idea that
women are better multi-taskers than men is commonly
held by lay people (for a review see Mäntylä 2013). While
the empirical evidence for women outperforming men in
multi-tasking has been sparse, researchers have shown
that women are involvedmore in multi-tasking than men,
for example in house-hold tasks (Offer and Schneider
2011; Sayer 2007). In this paper we address the question
if it is true that women actually outperform men when
multi-tasking.
Multi-tasking is a relatively broad concept in psychol-
ogy, developed over several decades of research (for a
review see Salvucci and Taatgen 2010); this research has
enormous relevance for understanding the risk of multi-
tasking in real-life situations, such as driving while using a
mobile phone (Watson and Strayer 2010).
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There are at least two distinct types of multi-tasking
abilities. The first type is the skill of being able to deal
with multiple task demands without the need to carry
out the involved tasks simultaneously. A good example of
this type of multi-tasking is carried out by administrative
assistants, who answer phone calls, fill in paperwork, sort
incoming faxes and mail, and typically do not carry out
any of these tasks simultaneously.
A second type of multi-tasking ability is required when
two types of information must be processed or carried
out simultaneously. An example of the latter category is
drawing a circle with one hand while drawing a straight
line with the other hand. While humans have no diffi-
culty carrying out each of these tasks individually, drawing
a circle with one hand and drawing a straight line with
the other simultaneously is nearly impossible (the circle
becomes more of an ellipse and the line more of a circle,
Franz et al. 1991). Another example is the requirement to
process different types of sensory information at the same
time (Pashler 1984), such as different auditory streams on
different ears (Broadbent 1952). While humans frequently
are asked to do such tasks in the psychological laboratory,
© 2013 Stoet et al.; licensee BioMed Central Ltd. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative
Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
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humans seem to try to avoid these situations in real life,
unless they are highly trained (e.g., playing piano, with
the left and right hands playing different notes, or hav-
ing a conversation while driving a car). Arguably, we are
not good at doing multiple tasks simultaneously (except
when well trained), and that probably explains why this
type of multi-tasking is less common than the type in
which we serially alternate between two tasks (Burgess
2000). It is because of this that we focus on the first type
of multi-tasking in this study. Also, it is important to note
that the two types of multi-tasking described above are
two extreme examples on a continuum of multi-tasking
scenarios.
Cognitive scientists and psychiatrists have postulated
a special set of cognitive functions that help with the
coordination ofmultiple thought processes, which include
the skills necessary for multi-tasking, namely “executive
functions” (Royall et al. 2002): task planning, postponing
tasks depending on urgency and needs (i.e., scheduling),
and ignoring task-irrelevant information (also known as
“inhibition”). Healthy adults can reasonably well inter-
leave two novel tasks rapidly (Vandierendonck et al. 2010).
The involved (human) brain areas necessary for multi-
tasking have been investigated and we can at the very least
make a reasonable estimate of which are involved (Burgess
et al. 2000). Among primates, humans seem to have a
unique way of dealing with task switching (Stoet and
Snyder 2003), which we hypothesize reflects an evolution-
ary unique solution for dealing with the advantages and
disadvantages of multi-tasking (Stoet and Snyder 2012).
The specific contributions of individual brain areas to
executive control skills in humans have been linked to a
number of mental disorders, in particular schizophrenia
(Evans et al. 1997; Kravariti et al. 2005; Royall et al. 2002;
Semkovska et al. 2004; Dibben et al. 2009; Hill et al. 2004;
Laws 1999).
Currently, there are few studies on gender and multi-
tasking, despite a seemingly confident public opinion that
women are better in multi-tasking than men (Ren et al.
2009). Ren and colleagues (2009) extrapolated the hunter-
gatherer hypothesis (Silverman and Eals 1992) to make
predictions about male and female multi-tasking skills.
The hunter-gatherer hypothesis proposes that men and
women have cognitively adapted to a division of labor
between the sexes (i.e., men are optimized for hunt-
ing, and women are optimized for gathering). Ren and
colleagues speculated that women’s gathering needed to
be combined with looking after children, which possibly
requires more multi-tasking than doing a task without
having to look after your offspring. In their experi-
ment, men and women performed an Eriksen flanker task
(Eriksen and Eriksen 1974) either on its own (i.e., single
task condition) or preceded by an unrelated other cogni-
tive decision making task (i.e., multi-tasking condition).
They found that in the multi-tasking condition, women
were less affected by the task-irrelevant flankers thanmen.
Thus, the latter study supports the hypothesis that women
are better multi-taskers.
We tested whether women outperform men in the first
type of multi-tasking. In Experiment 1, we tested whether
women perform better than men in a computer-based
task-switching paradigm. In Experiment 2a, we tested
whether women outperformmen in a task designed to test
“planning” in a “real-life” context that included standard-
ized tests of executive control functions. Our prediction
was that women would outperform men.
Experiment 1
In this experiment, we used a task-switching paradigm
to measure task-switching abilities. Task-switching
paradigms are designed to measure the difficulty of
rapidly switching attention between two (or more) tasks.
Typically, in these types of studies, performing a task
consists of a simple response (e.g., button press with left
or right hand) to a simple stimulus (e.g., a digit) according
to simple rules (e.g., odd digits require left hand response,
even digits a right hand response).
In task-switching paradigms, there are usualy two dif-
ferent tasks (e.g., in task A deciding whether digits are odd
or even, and in task B deciding whether digits are lower
or higher than the value 5). An easy way to think of task-
switching paradigms is to call one task “A” and another
task “B”. A block of just ten trials of task A can be written
as “AAAAAAAAAA” and a block of just ten trials of task
B can be written as “BBBBBBBBBB”. Most adults find car-
rying out sequences of one task type relatively simple. In
contrast, interleaving trials like “AABBAABBAABB” is dif-
ficult, as demonstrated for the first time in 1927 by Jersild
(1927). Today, the slowing down associated with carrying
out a block of mixed trials compared to a block of pure
trials is known as “mixing cost”. Further, within mixed
blocks, people slow down particularly on trials that imme-
diately follow a task switch (in AABBAA there are two
such trials, here indicated in bold font); the latter effect is
known as “switch cost”.
Researchers have given switch costs more atten-
tion than mixing costs, especially since the mid-1990s
(Vandierendonck et al. 2010)b. In the current experiment,
we measured both types of costs.
Methods
Participants
We recruited participants via online advertisements and
fliers in West Yorkshire (UK). Our recruitment procedure
excluded participants with health problems and disor-
ders that could potentially affect their performance, which
included color-vision deficits, as tested with the Ishi-
hara color test (Ishihara 1998) before each experimental
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session. Altogether, we selected 240 participants stratified
by gender and age (Figure 1).
Research ethics
Research was in accordance with the declaration of
Helsinki, and approval of ethical standards for Experiment
1 was given by the ethics committee of the Institute of
Psychological Sciences, University of Leeds. All partici-
pants gave written or verbal consent to participate.
Apparatus and stimuli
The experiment was controlled by a Linux operated PC
using PsyToolkit software (Stoet 2010). A 17” color mon-
itor and a Cedrus USB keyboard (model RB-834) were
used for stimulus presentation and response registration,
respectively. Of the Cedrus keyboard, only two buttons
were used. These were the buttons closest to the partic-
ipant (3.2 × 2.2 cm each, with 4.3 cm between the two
buttons), which we will further refer to as the left and right
button, respectively.
A rectangular frame (7 × 8 cm) with an upper and lower
section (Figure 2a) was displayed. The words “shape”
and “filling” were presented above and below the frame,
respectively. Further four imperative stimuli were used in
different trials (Figure 2b). These four were the combina-
tion of two shapes (diamond and rectangle) and a filling of
two or three circles. The frame and the imperative stimuli
were yellow and were presented on a black background.
Feedback messages were presented following trials that
were not performed correctly (“Time is up” or “That was
the wrong key”).
Procedure
Participants were seated in a quiet and dimly lit room, and
received written and verbal instructions from the experi-
menter. They were instructed to respond to stimuli on the
computer screen. There were two different tasks, namely a
shape and a filling task. In the shape task, participants had
to respond to the shape of imperative stimuli (diamonds
and rectangles required a left and right response, respec-
tively). In the filling task, participants had to respond to
the number of circles within the shape (two and three
circles required a left and right response, respectively).
The essential feature of this procedure was that both task
dimensions (shape and filling) were always present and
that the two dimensions required opposite responses on
half the trials (incongruent stimuli). This meant that par-
ticipants were forced to think of which of the two tasks
needed to be carried out and to attend to the relevant
stimulus dimension. Participants were informed which
task to carry out based on the imperative stimulus loca-
tion: If the stimulus appeared in the upper half of the
frame, labeled “shape”, they had to carry out the shape
task, and when it appeared in the bottom half of the frame,
labeled “filling”, they had to carry out the filling task.
Participants first went through 3 training blocks (40
trials), and then performed 3 further blocks (192 tri-
als total) that were used in the data analysis. The first
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Figure 1 The distribution of participants by gender and age. The average age of women was 27.4 years (SD = 6.0); the average age of men was
27.8 years (SD = 6.4).
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A
Figure 2 Schematic representation of the task-switching
paradigm. A: Example trial. During a block of trials, a rectangular
frame with the labels “shape” and “filling” was visible. On each trial, a
different imperative stimulus (i.e., a stimulus that requires an
immediate response) was presented in the top or bottom part of this
frame. The location (i.e., in top or bottom part of frame) determined
whether the participant had to apply the shape or filling task rules to
it. B: There were four different imperative stimuli, which needed to be
responded to as follows. In the shape task, a “diamond” required a
left-button response, and a rectangle a right-button response. In the
filling task, a filling of two circles required a left-button response, and
a filling of three circles a right-button response. Congruent stimuli are
those that required the same response in both tasks, whereas
incongruent stimuli required opposite responses in the two tasks.
Thus, the imperative stimulus in panel A is incongruent: It appears in
the top of the frame, thus is should be responded to in accordance to
the shape task, and because it is a diamond (the filling of three circles
is irrelevant in the shape task) it should be responded to with a
left-button response (see Additional file 1 for demonstration).
two blocks were blocks with just one of the two tasks
(pure blocks), and in the third block the two tasks were
randomly interleaved (mixed block). In the mixed block,
task-switch trials were those following a trial of the alter-
native task, and task-repeat trials were those following the
same task. The order of blocks was identical for all par-
ticipants. The computer used a randomisation function
to choose which task would occur on a given trial. Fur-
ther, it is important to note that participants had training
in both tasks before the blocks started that were used for
data analysis; this means that even in the first pure block
of the analyzed data, participants were aware that incon-
gruent stimuli were associated with opposite responses in
the alternative task.
In each trial, the frame and its labels (as displayed in
Figure 2a) were visible throughout the blocks. When an
imperative stimulus (one of the four shown in Figure 2b)
appeared (they were chosen at random by the software),
participants had up to 4 seconds to respond. The impera-
tive stimulus disappeared following a response or follow-
ing the 4 seconds in case no response was given. Incorrect
responses (or failures to respond) were followed by a 5 sec-
onds lasting reminder of the stimulus-response mapping,
and then followed by a 500 ms pause. The intertrial inter-
val lasted 800 ms. A demonstration of the task is available
in the Additional file 1.
When we report response times in task switching trials
or in pure blocks, we always report the average of both
tasks. For example, when reporting the response times in
the pure blocks, we will report the average of the pure
block of the shape task and pure block of the filling task.
Results
Response time analyses were based on response times in
correct trials following at least one other correct trial.
Further, we excluded all participants who performed not
significantly different from chance level in all conditions.
This exclusion is necessary, given that response time anal-
yses in cognitive psychology are based on the assumption
that response times reflect decision time. When partici-
pants guess, for example because they find the task diffi-
cult, the response times are no longer informative of their
decision time.
The procedure for testing if participants performed bet-
ter than chance was carried out as follows. Given that
there were only two equally likely response alternatives on
each trial, participants had 50% chance to get a response
correct. To determine if a participant performed signifi-
cantly better than chance level, we applied a binomial test
to the error rates in each condition. Based on this analysis,
we concluded that nine participants (5 men and 4 women,
aged 18-36) did not perform better than chance in at least
one experimental condition. We found that each of these
nine participants worked at chance level in the incon-
gruent task-switching condition (with error rates ranging
from 29% to 60%), and for five of them, this was the only
condition they failed in. None of these nine failed in the
pure task blocks. We excluded these participants from all
reported analyses.
The next set of analyses were carried out to confirm
that the used paradigm showed the typical effects of
task-switching and task-mixing paradigms as described in
the introduction (Figure 3). Throughout, we only report
statistically significant effects (α criterion of .05).
We analyzed task-switch and incongruency costs in
response times in the mixed blocks. We carried out a
mixed-design ANOVA with the within-subject factors
“switching” and “congruency” and between-subject fac-
tor “gender”. We found a significant effect of switching,
F(1, 229) = 743.90, p < .001: Participants responded
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Figure 3 The response times and error rates + 1 standard error
of the mean in the pure, task-switching and task-mixing
conditions. Further, data is split up for congruent and incongruent
stimuli, and for men and women.
247 ± 9 ms more slowly in the task-switch (1010 ± 14
ms) than in the task-repeat (763 ± 10) conditionc. Fur-
ther, participants were 35 ± 5 ms slower in incongruent
(904 ± 11 ms) than in congruent (869 ± 11 ms) trials,
F(1, 229) = 52.48, p < .001.
We repeated the same analysis on the error rates. Again,
we found a significant effect of switching, F(1,229) =
53.20, p<.001, with people making 1.97 ± 0.27 error per-
centage points (ppt) more in the task-switch (4.62 ±
0.27%) than in the task-repeat (2.65 ± 0.18%) condition.
Further, people made 3.77 ± 0.31 ppt more errors in
incongruent (5.52 ± 0.30%) than in congruent (1.75 ±
0.18%) trials, F(1, 229) = 143.90, p < .001. Finally,
the interaction between switching and congruency was
significant, F(1, 229) = 14.65, p < .001.
Next, we analyzed task-mixing costs using a similar
approach as above. Now, we contrasted trials in the pure
blocks with task-repeat trials inmixed block.We observed
a slow down of 319 ± 8 ms due to mixing, F(1, 229) =
1555.34, p < .001, with an average response time in mixed
trials of 763 ± 10 ms and in pure trials of 444 ± 5
ms. This effect interacted significantly with the gender of
participants. The slow down due to mixing was 336 ± 11
ms in men and 302 ± 12 ms in women (the effect size
of this gender difference expressed as Cohen’s d = 0.27).
We also found an effect of congruency, F(1, 229) = 24.46,
p < .001, with people responding 18 ± 4 ms slower in
incongruent (613 ± 7 ms) than congruent (594 ± 7 ms)
trials. Finally, there was a significant interaction between
mixing and congruency, F(1, 229) = 10.37, p = .001.
We carried out the same analysis using error rate as
dependent variable, and we found a significant effect of
task-mixing again. People made 0.55 ppt more errors in
the task mix condition (2.65 ± 0.18%) than in the pure
condition (2.10 ± 0.13%), F(1, 229) = 9.17, p = .003.
People made 1.77 ± 0.20 ppt more mistakes in the incon-
gruent (3.26 ± 0.19%) than in the congruent (1.49 ±
0.13%) condition, F(1, 229) = 80.86, p < .001. The fac-
tors switching and congruency interacted, F(1, 229) =
26.94, p < .001. In the error rates, there were no effects
of gender. Even so, it might be of interest to report that
women’s mixing cost in error rates was 0.50 ± 0.28 per-
centage points and that of men 0.60 ± 0.23 percentage
points.
Altogether, the ANOVAs of task-switching, task-
mixing, and congruency confirmed the well known pic-
ture of task-switching data. The novelty is the gender dif-
ference in task-mixing costs. Although men and women
did not show an overall speed difference, we wanted to
ensure that the gender difference was not simply related to
overall speed (e.g., people with larger switch costs might
also have had a different baseline speed). To do so, we
analyzed relative mixing costs as well. Relative mixing
costs is the percentage slowing down in mixed compared
to pure task blocks. For example, if a person responds
on average in 500 ms in mixing blocks and 400 ms in
pure blocks the person gets 25% slower due to mixing
tasks.
We found that when analyzing the relative slow down
due to mixing in relationship to performance in pure
blocks, there was a significant effect of gender. Women’s
relative slow down (69.1 ± 2.6%) was, in correspondence
to the ANOVA of the absolute response time, less than
that of men (77.2 ± 2.6%), t(229) = 2.18, p = .030; in
other words, both the analysis of absolute and relative
mixing costs show the same phenomenon.
Experiment 2
In Experiment 1, we found that men’s and women’s
performance differed in a computer-based task mea-
suring the capacity to rapidly switch between different
tasks. One of the difficulties with computer-based lab-
oratory tasks is their limited ecological validity. Exper-
iment 2 aimed to create a multi-tasking situation in
a “real-life” context that included standardized neuro-
cognitive tests.
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The approach of this experiment is based on tasks com-
mon in cognitive neuropsychology. From a neuropsycho-
logical perspective, Burgess (Burgess et al. 2000) described
multi-tasking as the ability to manage different tasks with
different (sometimes unpredictable) priorities that are
initiated and monitored in parallel. Furthermore, goals,
time, and other task constraints are seen as self defined
and flexible. Shallice and Burgess (Shallice and Burgess
1991) devised the Six Elements Test to assess precisely
these abilities (later modified by others, Wilson et al.
1998). In this task, participants receive instructions to
do three tasks (simple picture naming, simple arithmetic
and dictation), each of which has two sections, A and
B. The subject has 10 minutes to attempt at least part
of each of the six sections, with the proviso that they
cannot do sections A and B of the same task after each
other.
Burgess and colleagues (Burgess 2000; Burgess et al.
2000) have highlighted various features of multitasking
behaviour, including: (1) several discrete tasks to com-
plete; (2) interleaving required for effective dovetailing
of task performance; (3) performing only one task at a
particular time; (4) unforeseen interruptions; (5) delayed
intentions for the individual to return to a task which
is already running; (6) tasks that demand different task
characteristics (7) self-determining targets with which the
individual decides for him/herself; and (8) no minute-
by-minute feedback on how well an individual performs.
As Burgess and colleagues note, most laboratory-based
tasks do not include all of these features when assess-
ing multi-tasking. If this is indeed the case, there is
a real advantage in studying multi-tasking using this
approach.
Methods
Participants
We recruited 47 male and 47 female participants, largely
undergraduate students of Hertfordshire University. The
mean age was 24.2 years (SD = 8.1, range 18–60) for
men, and 22.6 years (SD = 5.6, range 18–49) for women;
there was no significant age difference between these two
groups, t(92) = 1.1, p = .28.
Research Ethics
Research was in accordance with the declaration of
Helsinki, and approval of ethical standards for Experi-
ment 2 was given by the ethics committee of the School of
Life andMedical Sciences, University of Hertfordshire. All
participants gave written or verbal consent to participate.
Material
We used three different tasks. The “Key Search task” was
taken from the Behavioral Assessment for Dysexecutive
Syndrome (BADS, Wilson et al. 1998). This is a specific
test of planning and strategy, in which participants are
required to sketch out how they might route an attempt to
search a “field” for a missing set of keys. This task is nor-
mally used as ameasure of problems in executive function,
and low scores are indicative of frontal lobe impairment.
In the healthy population, this task reveals no evidence of
a gender difference according to test norms and personal
communication with Jon Evans (one of the test designers).
The test designers reported a high (r = .99) correlation
between raters (Wilson et al. 1998).
TheMap search task was taken from the “Tests of Every-
day Attention” (Robertson et al. 1994). The task requires
individuals to find restaurant symbols on an unfamil-
iar color map of Philadelphia (USA) and its surrounding
areas. Again, this task reveals no evidence of a gender
difference according to the test norms and personal com-
munication with test designer Ian Robertson.
The third task was custom designed and involved solv-
ing simple arithmetical questions presented on paper as
shown in Figure 4. We did pilot these mathematics ques-
tions (unlike the first two tests, this test is not standard-
ised, and after piloting we moderated these questions to
make sure they could be largely successfully attempted
while doing the other tasks).
Although there are reports thatmen outperformwomen
on more complex mathematics problems, this is typically
Figure 4 Example of the arithmetic task.
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not the case for simple calculations like this (Halpern et al.
2007).
A scoring system established within the BADS marks
these plans according to set rules such as parallel patterns
and corner entry. A panel of 3 scorers agreed on the scores
for each test to ensure reliable scoring. Examples of key
search strategies are shown in Figure 5.
Procedure
Each participant was given 8 minutes to attempt the three
tasks described above (Arithmetic, Map, Key Search).
The layout of the position of the map task, maths task
and key search was counterbalanced to avoid any bias
affecting which tasks participants chose to do. They were
instructed that each task held equal marks; it was left to
participants to decide how they would organize their time
between each task. The participants were also informed
that they would receive a phone call at some unknown
time point (always after 4 minutes) asking them 8 sim-
ple general-knowledge questions (e.g., “What is the capital
of France”), it was again left to participants to decide
whether or not they answered the phone call. Without or
with answering the phone call, they were multi-tasking;
answering the call just added to that multi-tasking ’bur-
den’ as such. If they attempted to multi-task while answer-
ing the phone call, this was recorded. We recorded time
spent on each task as well as performance.
Results
We compared test scores (Table 1) and response times
(Table 2) of men and women using t tests. We found that
women (10.26 ± 0.58) scored significantly higher than
men (8.13± 0.68) on the key search task. Importantly, this
finding cannot simply be explained as a preference differ-
ence for the speed with which the task was carried out, as
no response time differences were found (Table 2).
Figure 5 Examples of the key search task. The example on the left
is from a male participant, the example on the right from a female
participant.
Table 1 Scores of men and women in Experiment 2
Task Men Women t test p value Cohen’s d
Arithmetic correct 19.68 (1.07) 17.29 (1.08) 1.57 .12 0.33
Map task (% correct) 75 (3.82) 72.00 (3.72) 0.52 .60 0.11
Key search score 8.13 (0.68) 10.26 (0.58) 5.6 .02 0.49
Standard errors in parentheses.
No differences emerged in the numbers of men and
women who answered the phone (79% of men and 81%
of women, χ2(1) = 0.06, p = .80). Those who answered
the phone heard 8 simple general knowledge questions
and the correct answers did not differ between men (3.35
± 0.35) and women (3.84±0.34), t(73) = 1.0, p = .32;
nor did time spent on the phone differ between men
(97.68 ± 3.13 seconds) and women (106.87 ± 3.65 sec-
onds), t(73) = 1.91, p = .06. Of those that did answer
the phone, we also measured whether they actively multi-
tasked while on the phone or concentrated purely on this
phone - and there was no significant difference 73% of
men and 84% of women multi-tasked, χ2(1) = 1.41,
p = .24.
Discussion
Using two very different experimental paradigms, we
found that women have an advantage over men in spe-
cific aspects of multi-tasking situations. In Experiment 1,
we measured response speed of men and women carrying
out two different tasks. We found that even though men
and women performed the individual tasks with the same
speed and accuracy, mixing the two tasks made men slow
down more so than women. From this, we conclude that
women have an advantage over men in multi-tasking (of
about one third of a standard deviation). In Experiment 2,
we measured men and women’s multi-tasking perfor-
mance in a more ecologically valid setting. We found that
women performed considerably better in one of the tasks
measuring high level cognitive control, in particular plan-
ning, monitoring, and inhibition. In both experiments, the
findings cannot be explained as a gender difference in a
speed-accuracy trade off. Altogether, we conclude that,
under certain conditions, women have an advantage over
men in multi-tasking.
Table 2 Response times (RT, seconds) of men and women
in Experiment 2
Task Men Women t test p value Cohen’s d
Arithmetic 312 (13) 341 (17) 1.33 .19 0.28
Map task 160 (16) 180 (14) 0.91 .37 0.19
Key search 36 (4) 36 (5) 0.03 .98 0.01
Standard errors in parentheses. The sum of the three individual tasks exceeds
the 480 allocated seconds, because sometimes the participants carried these
tasks out concurrently and so were double scored on time.
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Relation to other work
As noted in the introduction, there is almost no empir-
ical work addressing gender differences in multi-tasking
performance. For example, even though there are numer-
ous task-switching papers, none has focused on gender
differencesd. In fact, most task-switching studies do not
explore individual differences, and accordingly are carried
out with small samples.
Because they are typically carried out in psychology
undergraduate programmes (with less than 20% male stu-
dents), there are few male participants. The novelty of our
study is not only the relatively large number of partici-
pants, but also the good gender balance. Despite the few
studies about gender differences in multi-tasking, there
has been an interesting discussion very recently about a
study by Mäntylä (2013) which received much attention.
Probably the main reason for the attention in the media
for this study was the conclusion that men performed bet-
ter than women in a multi-tasking paradigm. The finding
of that study thus not only contrasts with the widely held
belief that women are better at task switching, it also con-
trasts with our current data and the experiment by Ren
and colleagues (2009).
In the study by Mäntylä (2013), men and women’s accu-
racy in a visual detection task was measured. Participants
had to detect specific numerical patterns in three different
counters presented on a computer screen. Simultaneously,
participants had to carry out an N-back task (stimuli
appeared above the aforementioned counters). Men had a
higher accuracy score of detecting the correct numerical
patterns than women. The latter study is of great interest,
because it addresses gender differences in multi-tasking
of the second type, namely when tasks need to be car-
ried out simultanously. Of interest is that for this specific
type of multi-tasking, men had an advantage over women,
and the degree of the advantage was directly related to
men’s advantage in spatial skills. But as argued in the
introduction, this type of multi-tasking is potentially of
less relevance to daily life contexts in which people often
carry out tasks sequentially. In a comment on the study by
Mäntylä (2013), Strayer and colleagues (2013) argue that
gender is a poor predictor of multi-tasking. They present
data to back this up from their own work on multi-tasking
when driving. Arguably, studies showing no gender dif-
ferences might simply have received less attention due
to a publication bias for positive effects. We think that
Strayer et al.’s comments are valuable to the discussion,
although their findings seem to primarily apply to the con-
current multi-tasking situations. That said, we found only
one study that reported no gender differences in a task-
switching paradigm in which people switched between
two tasks. Buser and Peter (Buser and Peter 2012) had
three groups of participants solving two different types
of puzzles (sudoku and word-search). The group that did
the two puzzles without switching between them solved
the puzzles best, while switching between the puzzles
while solving them impaired performance. The degree of
impairment was similar for men and women, irrespective
of whether the switching was voluntary or imposed. This
situation is somewhat similar to Experiment 2, and thus,
especially gender differences in this type of task-switching
need further study to draw strong conclusions.
Finally, our finding that men and women did not differ
in the effect of phone calls might be linked to a study by
Law and colleagues (2004). They stated that the effects of
interruptions are “quite subtle” and that more research on
their effect on multi-tasking is necessary.
Limitations
We would like to consider a number of limitations of
our current study that have implications for the interpre-
tation of our results. First, as already mentioned above,
there are many different ways to test multi-tasking per-
formance. Because this is an emerging field with a small
extant knowledge base we cannot exclude the possibil-
ity that our findings only hold true for the two specific
paradigms we employed. Given the aforementioned work
by Mäntylä (2013) and others that did not find the effect,
and the general sparsity of the reports on the effect, this is
a possibility that must be seriously considered.
A second limitation is that we did not formally record
levels of education or control for general cognitive abil-
ity. Although we think it is not very likely, we appreciate
the comment of one of the reviewers that if their were
different levels of education this could potentially affect
cognitive performance. The only way to exclude this pos-
sibility is to formally record the highest level of education
of all participants.
A third limitation is that the power of the Experiment 2
may be low. Again, it is difficult to say although evidently
powerful enough to detect moderate differences on the
key search task - so it may be a task-related issue and fur-
ther work needs to investigate task-based constraints in
multi-tasking. For example, we did not conclude that there
was a gender difference in arithmetic performance or time
spent on the phone, but this could potentially be due to a
lack of statistical power. In the case of the arithmetic task,
there are good reasons not to expect a gender difference
on simple arithmetic problems, even though we acknowl-
edge the complexity of the study of gender differences in
mathematical ability (c.f., Halpern et al. 2007).
A final limitation is that although we checked that no
gender differences emerged on the Key Search with both
the test authors and with the published norms, we can-
not eliminate the possibility that a difference may have
emerged tested alone. We could have retested the indi-
vidual tasks with another sample of participants. Also,
we could have run a repeated measures design (same
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participants on the individual tasks), although this would
defeat the novelty aspect of the task. The best way to
address this issue is for another research group to replicate
the finding.
Conclusions
Our findings support the notion that woman are better
than men in some types of multi-tasking (namely when
the tasks involved do not need to be carried out simultane-
ously). More research on this question is urgently needed,
before we can draw stronger conclusions and before we
can differentiate between different explanations.
Endnotes
aThe two experiments were carried out by independent
groups of researchers. We only realised the similarity
between the two experiments and their findings
afterwards. We believe that the two experiments
complement each other: While Experiment 1 uses a
laboratory based reaction time experiment, Experiment 2
uses a much more ecologically valid approach.
bThis is likely because of the availability of computers
to measure response times. In the 1920s, it would have
been hard, if not impossible, to accurately measure
task-switching costs, while measuring mixing costs could
be done with the paper-and-pensil tests used by Jersild
(1927).
cThroughout the results section, we report means ±1
standard error of the mean.
dTo the best of our knowledge.
Additional file
Additional file 1: Demonstration of task-switching paradigm (Java
application which runs on all desktop computers with Java installed).
Competing interests
The authors declare that they had no competing interests.
Authors’ contributions
GS, DO, and MC carried out Experiment 1. KL carried out Experiment 2. The
four authors wrote the article together. All authors read and approved the final
manuscript.
Acknowledgements
Experiment 1 was made possible with a grant from the British Academy to
Stoet, O’Connor, and Conner and with the assistance of Weili Dai, Caroline
Allen, and Tansi Warrilow.
Author details
1School of Education, University of Glasgow, Glasgow, Scotland, UK. 2Institute
of Psychological Sciences, University of Leeds, Leeds, West Yorkshire, UK.
3School of Life and Medical Sciences, University of Hertfordshire, Hatfield,
Hertfordshire, UK.
Received: 3 January 2013 Accepted: 28 August 2013
Published: 24 October 2013
References
Broadbent, DE (1952). Failures of attention in selective listening. Journal of
Experimental Psychology, 44(6), 428–433.
Burgess, PW (2000). Real-world multitasking from a cognitive neuroscience
perspective. In S Monsell & J Driver (Eds.), Attention and Performance,
Volume XVIII (pp. 465–472). Cambridge, MA: MIT press.
Burgess, PW, Veitch, E, Costello, AD, Shallice, T (2000). The cognitive and
neuroanatomical correlates of multitasking. Neuropsychologia,
38(6), 848–863.
Buser, T (2012). Multitasking. Experimental Economics, 15, 641–655.
Dibben, CRM, Rice, C, Laws, KR, McKenna, PJ (2009). Is executive impairment
associated with schizophrenic syndromes? A meta-analysis. Psychological
Medicine, 39, 381–392.
Eriksen, BA, & Eriksen, CW (1974). Effects of noise letters upon the identification
of a target letter in a nonsearch task. Perception and Psychophysics,
16, 143–149.
Evans, JJ, Chua, SE, McKenna, PJ, Wilson, BA (1997). Assessment of the
dysexecutive syndrome in schizophrenia. Psychological Medicine, 27(3),
635–646.
Franz, EA, Zelaznik, HN, McCabem, G (1991). Spatial topological constraints in a
bimanual task. Acta Psychologica, 77(2), 137–151.
Halpern, DF, Benbow, CP, Geary, DC, Gur, RC, Hyde, JS, Gernsbacher, MA (2007).
The science of sex differences in science and mathematics. Psychological
Science, 8, 1–51.
Hill, K, Mann, L, Laws, KR, Stephenson, CME, Nimmo-Smith, I, McKenna, PJ
(2004). Hyperfrontality in Schizophrenia. A meta-analysis of functional
imaging studies. Acta Psychiatrica Scandinavica, 110, 243–256.
Ishihara, S (1998). Ishihara’s Tests for Colour Blindness. London: Hodder Arnold.
Jersild, AT (1927). Mental set and shift. Archives of Psychology, 89, 1–81.
Kravariti, E, Dixon, T, Frith, C, Murray, R, McGuire, P (2005). Association of
symptoms and executive function in schizophrenia and bipolar disorder.
Schizophrenia Research, 74(2–3), 221–231.
Law, AS, Logie, RH, Pearson, DG, Cantagallo, A, Moretti, E, Dimarco, F (2004).
Resistance to the impact of interruptions during multitasking by healthy
adults and dysexecutive patients. Acta Psychologica, 116(3), 285–307.
Laws, KR (1999). A meta-analytic review of Wisconsin Card sorting studies in
Schizophrenia: a general intellectual deficit in disguise? Cognitive
Neuropsychiatry, 4, 1–35.
Mäntylä, T (2013). Gender differences in multitasking reflect spatial ability.
Psychological Science, 24, 514–520.
Offer, S, & Schneider, B (2011). Revisiting the gender gap in time-use patterns:
multitasking and well-being among mothers and fathers in dual-earner
families. American Sociological Review, 76(6), 809–833.
Pashler, H (1984). Processing stages in overlapping tasks: Evidence for a central
bottleneck. Journal of Experimental Psychology-human Perception And
Performance, 10(3), 358–377.
Ren, D, Zhou, H, Fu, X (2009). A deeper look at gender difference in
multitasking: gender-specific mechanism of cognitive control, In Fifth
international conference on natural computation (pp. 13–17). Washington:
IEEE Computer Society.
Robertson, IH, Ward, A, Ridgeway, V, Nimmo-Smith, I (1994). Tests of everyday
attention. Bury St Edmunds, U.K: Thames Valley Test Company.
Royall, DR, Lauterbach, EC, Cummings, JL, Reeve, A, Rummans, TA, Kaufer, DI,
LaFrance, WC, Coffey, CE (2002). Executive control function: a review of its
promise and challenges for clinical research. a report from the Committee
on Research of the American Neuropsychiatric Association. Journal of
Neuropsychiatry and Clinical Neurosciences, 14, 377–405.
Salvucci, DD, & Taatgen, NA (2010). Themultitaskingmind. Oxford, UK: Oxford
University Press.
Sayer, LC (2007). Gender differences in the relationship between long
employment hours and multitasking. In BA Rubin (Ed.),Workplace
Temporalities (Research in the Sociology of Work) (pp. 403–435). Amsterdam:
Elsevier.
Semkovska, M, Bedard, MA, Godbout, L, Limoge, F, Stip, E (2004). Assessment
of executive dysfunction during activities of daily living in schizophrenia.
Schizophrenia Research, 69(2-3), 289–300.
Shallice, T, & Burgess, PW (1991). Deficits in strategy application following
frontal lobe damage in man. Brain, 114, 727–741.
Silverman, I, & Eals, M (1992). Sex differences in spatial abilities: evolutionary
theory and data. In J Barkow, L Cosmides, J Tooby (Eds.), The Adapted Mind:
Stoet et al. BMC Psychology 2013, 1:18 Page 10 of 10
http://www.biomedcentral.com/2050-7283/1/18
Evolutionary Psychology and the Generation of Culture (pp. 487–503). New
York: Oxford University Press.
Stoet, G (2010). PsyToolkit – A software package for programming
psychological experiments using Linux. Behavior ResearchMethods, 42(4),
1096–1104.
Stoet, G, & Snyder, LH (2003). Task preparation in macaque monkeys (Macaca
mulatta). Animal Cognition, 6, 121–130.
Stoet, G, & Snyder, LH (2012). The role of executive control in tool use.
Behavioral and Brain sciences, 35, 240–241.
Strayer, DL, Medeiros-Ward, N, Watson, JM (2013). Gender invariance in
multitasking: a comment on Mäntylä (2013). Psychological Science, 24,
809–810.
Vandierendonck, A, Liefooghe, B, Verbruggen, F (2010). Task switching:
interplay of reconfiguration and interference control. Psychological Bulletin,
136(4), 601–626.
Watson, JM, & Strayer, DL (2010). Supertaskers: profiles in extraordinary
multitasking ability. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 17(4), 479–485.
Wilson, BA, Evans, JJ, Emslie, H, Alderman, N, Burgess, P (1998). The
development of an ecologically valid test for assessing patients with a
dysexecutive syndrome. Neuropsychological Rehabilitation, 8(3), 213–228.
doi:10.1186/2050-7283-1-18
Cite this article as: Stoet et al.: Are women better than men at multi-
tasking?. BMC Psychology 2013 1:18.
Submit your next manuscript to BioMed Central
and take full advantage of: 
• Convenient online submission
• Thorough peer review
• No space constraints or color ﬁgure charges
• Immediate publication on acceptance
• Inclusion in PubMed, CAS, Scopus and Google Scholar
• Research which is freely available for redistribution
Submit your manuscript at 
www.biomedcentral.com/submit
